Balance sheet structure and the managerial-dicretion hypothesis : an exploratory empirical study of New Zealand life insurance companies

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
  <record>
    <leader>00000cab a22000004b 4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20090037205</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20200717140816.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">090305e19950501nzl|||p      |0|||b|eng d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">341</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20110025595</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Adams, Mike</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Balance sheet structure and the managerial-dicretion hypothesis</subfield>
      <subfield code="b"> : an exploratory empirical study of New Zealand life insurance companies</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">by Mike Adams</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">The article discusses New Zealand life insurance company data for 1991 using canonical correlation analysis. Corporate shareholders of New Zealand-based stock companies generally have more widely-held voting rights than their subsidiaries. Even so, compared with the atomistic nature of policyholder ownership in mutuals, parent stock companies are much more closely controlled by their shareholders. Indeed, H. Demsetz argues that shareholdings are not so diffusely owned as is often supposed. Moreover, as shareholders in stock companies have the option to sell their residual claims and that this can enhance concentration of ownership. The option of trading residual rights does not exist to the same degree in mutuals. In other words, it is the absence of the threat of concentrated control rather than the absence of control per se which makes the contracting incentive conflicts between policyholders and managers so acute in the mutual form. Clearly, policyholders with participatory rights (with-profits) policies will also have an interest in short-term profitability inasmuch as it affects their annual bonuses</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080590567</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Empresas de seguros</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080570590</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Seguro de vida</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080555061</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Management</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080610739</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Estructura organizativa</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080557010</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Accionistas</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080571696</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Control interno</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20090005181</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Nueva Zelanda</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="t">Accounting & Finance</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">Vol. 35, Issue 1, May 1995 ; p. 21-45</subfield>
    </datafield>
  </record>
</collection>