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Banking regulation in an equilibrium model

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Section: Electronic documents
Title: Banking regulation in an equilibrium model / F. Javier SuárezAuthor: Suárez, F. Javier
Publication: Madrid : Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, 1993Physical description: 51 p. ; 21 cmSeries: (Documento de trabajo ; 9308)Notes: Sumario: In this paper, I analyze banking prudential regulation in an equilibrium model. Deposits are governmentally insured. Under plausible circumstances, subsidization of risk-taking by a flat rate premium leads to overinvestment in risky projects. Prudential regulation does not only cause direct effects on the solvency of risky banks, but also modifies the equilibrium allocation of wealth and intermediation margins. The equilibrium outcome affects the solvency of individual banks through the aggregate market variables, reinforcing or weakening the direct effect of any regulation reformMateria / lugar / evento: Depósitos bancarios Garantía de depósitos Banca Solvencia Otros autores: Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros
Secondary series: Documento de trabajo ; 9308 Other categories: 921.91