Owners on both sides of the deal : mergers and acquisitions and overlapping institutional ownership

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
  <record>
    <leader>00000cab a2200000   4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20100068939</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20100909193858.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">100903e20101015esp|||p      |0|||b|spa d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">922.111.3</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20100048108</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Goranova, M.</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Owners on both sides of the deal</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">: mergers and acquisitions and overlapping institutional ownership</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">M. Goranova, R. Dharwadkar, P. Brandes</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Using a corporate governance lens, this study considers owners wiíh a stake in both the acquiring and the target firms in the context of mergers and acquisitions. A possible agency problem arises with regard to monitoring implications as managers may be able to take advantage of comprommised monitoring because overlapping owners may focus on the aggregate valué for both the acquiring and the target firms and nonoverlapping owners maybe interested only in the acquirer's side of the dea!. The results suggest that when more owners overlap in their ownership of both the acquiring and target firms, the acquiring firms are more likely to experience decreased shareholder value through merger and acquisition deals. This effect, however, can be constrained by stronger board control. </subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080600938</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Dirección de empresas</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080555061</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Management</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080609955</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Controlling estratégico</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080609320</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Adquisición de empresas</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080609184</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Valoración de empresas</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080612849</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Transmisión de empresas</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20100049181</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Dharwadkar, R.</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20100049198</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Brandes, P.</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="w">MAP20077100307</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">Strategic Management Journal</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Chichester : John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 1991-2010</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0143-2095</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">15/10/2010 Tomo 31 Número 10  - 2010 , p. 1114-1135</subfield>
    </datafield>
  </record>
</collection>