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Economic models of compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents : some lessons for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
MARC record
Tag12Value
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001  MAP20070022582
003  MAP
005  20090423121650.0
007  hzruuu---uuuu
008  950526s1995 zzz 00010 eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎328.3
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080097967‎$a‎Faure, Michael
24510‎$a‎Economic models of compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents‎$b‎: some lessons for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions‎$c‎Michael Faure
260  ‎$a‎[S.l.‎$b‎s.n.]‎$c‎1995
300  ‎$a‎[22] p.‎$c‎24 cm
500  ‎$a‎Separata de: European journal of law and economics, 2:21-43 (1995)
520  ‎$a‎In this paper the economic analysis of accident law is used to examine the liability for nuclear accidents. It is argued that the classic system of individual liability of a nuclear power plant operator with a financial cap on compensation and individual insurance by national pools is not effective. The current system leads to a too low compensation for victims and lacks an adequate internalization of the nuclear risk. Hence, it is argued that the economic analysis of law can provide useful insights for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions on the liability for nuclear accidents. It is also argued that higher amounts of compensation can be generated only if the idea is accepted that all plants share the costs of an accident wherever it occurs. This could be realized through a mutual pooling system. Such a system could also be fitted into the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080615383‎$a‎Seguro de riesgo nuclear
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080570477‎$a‎Riesgo atómico
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080602994‎$a‎Pools de aseguradores
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080594428‎$a‎Accidentes nucleares
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080603588‎$a‎Responsabilidad civil
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080572396‎$a‎Indemnizaciones
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080627294‎$a‎Modelos de valoración económica