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Managerial discretion and corporate governance in publicly traded firms : evidence from the property-liability insurance industry

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<titleInfo>
<title>Managerial discretion and corporate governance in publicly traded firms</title>
<subTitle>: evidence from the property-liability insurance industry</subTitle>
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<genre authority="marcgt">periodical</genre>
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<placeTerm type="code" authority="marccountry">esp</placeTerm>
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<dateIssued encoding="marc">2011</dateIssued>
<issuance>serial</issuance>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">We study the incremental impact of corporate governance in mitigating managerial discretion, controlling for incentive alignment of managerial ownership. We extend the managerial discretion hypothesis to predict that for firms with the same set of governance tools, those that utilize governance tools more stringently to control agency costs will command greater contracting cost advantages, leading them to specialize in business with greater managerial discretion. Using 72 publicly traded insurers from 1994 to 2006, we find evidence supporting our hypothesis. Our findings complement the finance literature that focuses on the role of financing policies in mitigating agency costs of managerial discretion.</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Steve M. Miller</note>
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<topic>Mercado de seguros</topic>
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<topic>Empresas de seguros</topic>
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<topic>Seguro de daños patrimoniales</topic>
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<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080596880">
<topic>Gobierno corporativo</topic>
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<topic>Sociedades cotizadas</topic>
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<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080586317">
<topic>Mercado de valores</topic>
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<topic>Incentivos</topic>
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<topic>Directivos de empresas</topic>
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<title>The Journal of risk and insurance</title>
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<publisher>Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">0022-4367</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077000727</identifier>
<part>
<text>01/09/2011 Tomo 78 Número 3  - 2011 , p. 731-760</text>
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<recordCreationDate encoding="marc">110926</recordCreationDate>
<recordChangeDate encoding="iso8601">20110929130900.0</recordChangeDate>
<recordIdentifier source="MAP">MAP20110056469</recordIdentifier>
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