Corporate governance and cash holdings : evidence from the U.S. property-liability insurance industry

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<title>Corporate governance and cash holdings</title>
<subTitle>: evidence from the U.S. property-liability insurance industry</subTitle>
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<namePart>Hsu, Wen-Yen</namePart>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">This article examines the impact of board and finance committee characteristics on insurers' cash holdings using a sample of 1,454 U.S. stock propertyliability insurer-year observations. We focus on the roles of independent board members and independent finance committee members. Our results suggest that independent board members allow managers to hold excess cash holdings to avoid underinvestment and play a monitoring role in managers' cash spending behavior in a regulated industry. The overall findings are consistent with the independent director responsibility hypothesis, which suggests that independent directors play a monitoring role in managers' cash spending behavior and avoiding underinvestment problems.</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Wen-Yen Hsu, Yenyu Huang, Gene Lai</note>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080624934">
<topic>Seguro de daños patrimoniales</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080548766">
<topic>Property</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080551490">
<topic>Liability</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080586294">
<topic>Mercado de seguros</topic>
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<topic>Responsabilidad civil</topic>
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<geographic>Estados Unidos</geographic>
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<title>The Journal of risk and insurance</title>
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<publisher>Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">0022-4367</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077000727</identifier>
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<text>07/09/2015 Volumen 82 Número 3 - septiembre 2015 , p. 715-748</text>
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