Between-group adverse selection : evidence from group critical illness insurance
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| Tag | 1 | 2 | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000cab a2200000 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20170019602 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20170621131545.0 | ||
| 008 | 170613e20170605esp|||p |0|||b|spa d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP | ||
| 084 | $a344.1 | ||
| 100 | $0MAPA20080644529$aEling, Martin | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aBetween-group adverse selection$b: evidence from group critical illness insurance$cMartin Efing, Ruo Jia, Yi Yao |
| 520 | $aThis article demonstrates the presence of adverse selection in the group insurance market. Conventional wisdom suggests that group insurance mitigates adverse selection because it minimizes individual choice. We complement this conventional wisdom by analyzing a group insurance scenario in which individual choice is excluded, and we find that group insurance alone is not effective enough to eliminate adverse selection; that is, between-group adverse selection exists. Between-group adverse selection, however, disappears over time if the group renews with the same insurer for a certain period. Our results thus indicate that experience rating and underwriting based on information that insurers learn over time are important in addressing adverse selection. | ||
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080624941$aSeguro de enfermedades graves | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080582661$aSelección adversa | |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20170005070$aJia, Ruo | |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20120019829$aYao, Yi | |
| 773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g05/06/2017 Volumen 84 Número 2 - junio 2017 , p. 771-809 |