Risk sharing with expected and dual utilities

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
  <record>
    <leader>00000cab a2200000   4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20170019787</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20170621141828.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">170614e20170501esp|||p      |0|||b|spa d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">6</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20210031915</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Boonen, Tim J</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Risk sharing with expected and dual utilities</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Tim J. Boonen</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">This paper analyzes optimal risk sharing among agents that are endowed with either expected utility preferences or with dual utility preferences. We find that Pareto optimal risk redistributions and the competitive equilibria can be obtained via bargaining with a hypothetical representative agent of expected utility maximizers and a hypothetical representative agent of dual utility maximizers. The representative agent of expected utility maximizers resembles an average risk-averse agent, whereas representative agent of dual utility maximizers resembles an agent that has lowest aversion to mean-preserving spreads. This bargaining leads to an allocation of the aggregate risk to both groups of agents. The optimal contract for the expected utility maximizers is proportional to their allocated risk, and the optimal contract for the dual utility maximizing agents is given by tranching of their allocated risk. We show a method to derive equilibrium prices. We identify a condition under which prices are locally independent of the expected utility functions, and given in closed form. Moreover, we characterize uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium.</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080559694</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Negociación</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080550271</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Contratos</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080545260</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Riesgos</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080579258</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Cálculo actuarial</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080583415</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Agentes de seguros</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080591182</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Gerencia de riesgos</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="w">MAP20077000420</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">Astin bulletin</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Belgium : ASTIN and AFIR Sections of the International Actuarial Association</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0515-0361</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">01/05/2017 Volumen 47 Número 2 - mayo 2017 , p. 391-415</subfield>
    </datafield>
  </record>
</collection>