Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Social security and retirement

Publication: Getafe [Madrid] : Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía, 1997Physical description: 86 p. ; 30 cmSeries: (Working paper ; 97-55. Economics series ; 26)Notes: Materia: This paper examines the interplay between the retirement incentives generated by the Spanish public pension system and the decision to early retire from the labor force. For many workers, particularity those with below-median earning profiles or with incomplete working histories, retirement at ages earlier then 65 appears to be the most rational strategy. Indeed we calculate that, exception made for workers in the upper twenty percent of the earnings distribution, the current system generates strong incentives to retire before the age of 65. We identify the minimun pension rule, embedded in the Spanish legislation, as the most important source of such incentives. We apply the ghts from our study to a preliminary evaluation of the reform legislation just enacted (July 26, 1997). We find it doubtful that it may seriously weaken such incentives. On the contrary, the final outcome may be an increase in the proportion of workers for which the minimun pension is binding, thereby increasing the incentive to early retirement.Materia / lugar / evento: Seguridad Social Seguro de jubilación Jubilación anticipada España Otros autores: Jiménez-Martín, Sergi
Peracchi, Franco
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economía
Secondary series: Working paper ; 97-55. Economics series ; 26 Other categories: 44

Rights: In Copyright (InC)

Referencias externas:

Holdings:

FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE. Centro de Documentación

FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE. Centro de Documentación — Signature: 44-BOL-SOC — Record number: 023661

Loan:

Available