What drives tort reform legislation? : an analysis of state decisions to restrict liability torts
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| Tag | 1 | 2 | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000cab a2200000 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20180035166 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20190103114825.0 | ||
| 008 | 181228e20181203esp|||p |0|||b|spa d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP | ||
| 084 | $a33 | ||
| 100 | $0MAPA20180015984$aDeng, Yiling | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aWhat drives tort reform legislation?$b: an analysis of state decisions to restrict liability torts$cYiling Deng, George Zanjani |
| 520 | $aThis article studies the timing of state-level tort reform enactments between 1971 and 2005. Using discrete-time hazard models, we find the level of litigation activity -as measured by incurred liability insurance losses, the number of lawyers, and tort cases commenced- to be the most important and robust determinant of tort reform adoption. Political-institutional factors and regional effects -such as Republican control of the state government, single-party control of the legislature and governorship, and a (relatively) conservative political ideology among a state's Democrats- are also associated with quicker reform adoption | ||
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080627638$aSeguro de responsabilidad civil | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080559236$aLegislación | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080603588$aResponsabilidad civil | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080592059$aModelos predictivos | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080616984$aEstudios de investigación | |
| 650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080607616$aPenetración del seguro | |
| 651 | 1 | $0MAPA20080638337$aEstados Unidos | |
| 700 | $0MAPA20100047651$aZanjani, George | ||
| 773 | 0 | $wMAP20077000727$tThe Journal of risk and insurance$dNueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-$x0022-4367$g03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 959-991 |