Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Jia, Ning</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Tang, Xuesong</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2018-12-03</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the behavior of independent directors and the effectiveness of their governance role. Using a unique data set, we find a negative relation between D&O insurance and personal board meeting attendance by independent directors and a positive relation between D&O insurance and meeting attendance by authorized representatives. Content analysis of independent director opinion reports indicates that D&O insurance encourages independent directors to behave less responsibly. Insured independent directors are also more likely to be busy. Collectively, D&O insurance reduces the effectiveness of independent directors in corporate governance</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/166527.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de responsabilidad civil patronal</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro D&O</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Directors and officers (insurance)</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Directivos de empresas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Consejo de Administración</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Litigios</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Estadísticas</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Directors' and officers' liability insurance, independent directors behavior, and governance effect</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 1013-1054</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>