Moral hazard and long-term care insurance

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<dc:creator>Konetzka, R. Tamara</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2019-04-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: In private long-term care insurance markets, moral hazard is central to pricing and long-run robustness of the market, yet there is remarkably little evidence on the extent to which moral hazard is present in long-term care insurance. We use Health and Retirement Study data from 1996 to 2014 to assess moral hazard in nursing home and home care use in private long-term care insurance, employing a combination of propensity score matching and instrumental variables approaches. We find evidence of significant moral hazard in home care use and a potentially meaningful but noisy effect on nursing home use. Policymakers designing incentives to promote private long-term care insurance should consider the consequences of moral hazard.

</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/167792.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de dependencia</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Productos de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Evaluación de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Riesgo moral</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Moral hazard and long-term care insurance</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice. - Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976- = ISSN 1018-5895. - 01/04/2019 Volumen 44 Número 2 - abril 2019 , p. 231-251</dc:relation>
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