Moral hazard and long-term care insurance

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      <subfield code="c">R. Tamara Konetzka...[et.al]</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">In private long-term care insurance markets, moral hazard is central to pricing and long-run robustness of the market, yet there is remarkably little evidence on the extent to which moral hazard is present in long-term care insurance. We use Health and Retirement Study data from 1996 to 2014 to assess moral hazard in nursing home and home care use in private long-term care insurance, employing a combination of propensity score matching and instrumental variables approaches. We find evidence of significant moral hazard in home care use and a potentially meaningful but noisy effect on nursing home use. Policymakers designing incentives to promote private long-term care insurance should consider the consequences of moral hazard.

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      <subfield code="g">01/04/2019 Volumen 44 Número 2 - abril 2019 , p. 231-251</subfield>
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