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CEO inside debt and risk taking : evidence from property-liability insurance firms
Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
MARC record
Tag12Value
LDR  00000cab a2200000 4500
001  MAP20190019668
003  MAP
005  20190625125336.0
008  190624e20190603usa|||p |0|||b|eng d
040  ‎$a‎​MAP‎$b‎​spa‎$d‎​MAP
084  ‎$a‎​32
100  ‎$0‎​MAPA20110023713‎$a‎​Milidonis, Andreas ‌
24500‎$a‎​CEO inside debt and risk taking‎$b‎​: evidence from property-liability insurance firms‎$c‎​Andreas Milidonis, Harald Nishikawa, Jeungbo Shim
300  ‎$a‎​27 p.
520  ‎$a‎​We examine the incentive effects of CEO inside debt holdings (pensions and deferred compensation) on risk taking using the sample of U.S. publicly traded propertyliability insurers. To represent managerial risk taking, we employ value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), which capture extreme movements in the lower tail of insurer stock return distribution. We also estimate firm default risk, equity volatilities,and insurance-related risk as alternative measures of risk taking. We document that inside debt represents a significant component of CEOs' compensation in the insurance industry. We find that there is a significant and negative relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and risk-taking behavior. The results suggest that the structure of executive debt-like compensation could be a potential method of reducing managers' risk-taking incentives.
650 4‎$0‎​MAPA20080604394‎$a‎​Valoración de riesgos ‌
650 4‎$0‎​MAPA20080609627‎$a‎​Chief Executive Officer ‌
650 4‎$0‎​MAPA20080624934‎$a‎​Seguro de daños patrimoniales ‌
650 4‎$0‎​MAPA20080591281‎$a‎​Grupos aseguradores ‌
651 1‎$0‎​MAPA20080638337‎$a‎​Estados Unidos ‌
7001 ‎$0‎​MAPA20190008570‎$a‎​Nishikawa, Harald ‌
700  ‎$0‎​MAPA20100054109‎$a‎​Shim, Jeungbo ‌
7730 ‎$w‎​MAP20077000727‎$t‎​The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎​Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎​0022-4367‎$g‎​03/06/2019 Volumen 86 Número 2 - junio 2019 , p. 451-477