Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - CEO inside debt and risk taking : evidence from property-liability insurance firms

Physical description: 27 p. Notes: Sumario: We examine the incentive effects of CEO inside debt holdings (pensions and deferred compensation) on risk taking using the sample of U.S. publicly traded propertyliability insurers. To represent managerial risk taking, we employ value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), which capture extreme movements in the lower tail of insurer stock return distribution. We also estimate firm default risk, equity volatilities,and insurance-related risk as alternative measures of risk taking. We document that inside debt represents a significant component of CEOs' compensation in the insurance industry. We find that there is a significant and negative relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and risk-taking behavior. The results suggest that the structure of executive debt-like compensation could be a potential method of reducing managers' risk-taking incentives.Related records: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 03/06/2019 Volumen 86 Número 2 - junio 2019 , p. 451-477Materia / lugar / evento: Valoración de riesgos Chief Executive Officer Seguro de daños patrimoniales Grupos aseguradores Estados Unidos Otros autores: Nishikawa, Harald
Shim, Jeungbo
Other categories: 32

Rights: In Copyright (InC)

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