Improving risk sharing and borrower incentives in mortgage design
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
<record>
<leader>00000cab a2200000 4500</leader>
<controlfield tag="001">MAP20200004806</controlfield>
<controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
<controlfield tag="005">20200221140203.0</controlfield>
<controlfield tag="008">200217e20191202usa|||p |0|||b|eng d</controlfield>
<datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
<subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
<subfield code="b">eng</subfield>
<subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
<subfield code="a">921.94</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20200003410</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Mei, Yuchen</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
<subfield code="a">Improving risk sharing and borrower incentives in mortgage design</subfield>
<subfield code="c">Yuchen Mei, Phelim Boyle and Johnny Siu-Hang Li</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
<subfield code="a">In a traditional fixed rate mortgage, the borrower pays a fixed amount each period regardless of the value of the mortgaged property. One problem with this contract is that the borrower is less willing to pay when the house value falls. This was clearly seen in the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath when mortgage default rates and foreclosures skyrocketed as the housing market crashed. A more efficient contract design should link payments to house prices so that the borrower's incentive to pay is not undermined by a decline in property value. In addition, this design can save the lender the deadweight foreclosure costs. In this article, we examine two proposed index linked mortgages that have this risk sharing feature. We analyze the effect of both designs on borrower incentives in a multiperiod setting.</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20080610319</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Distribución de riesgos</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20080554774</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Incentivos</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20080551193</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Hipotecas</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20080607876</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Préstamos hipotecarios</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20080566784</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Participación</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20080595548</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Contratos de crédito</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="1">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20080638337</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Estados Unidos</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20130000817</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Boyle, Phelim</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
<subfield code="0">MAPA20100040126</subfield>
<subfield code="a">Siu-Hang Li, Johnny</subfield>
</datafield>
<datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
<subfield code="w">MAP20077000239</subfield>
<subfield code="t">North American actuarial journal</subfield>
<subfield code="d">Schaumburg : Society of Actuaries, 1997-</subfield>
<subfield code="x">1092-0277</subfield>
<subfield code="g">02/12/2019 Tomo 23 Número 4 - 2019 , p. 485-511</subfield>
</datafield>
</record>
</collection>