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Insurance fraud in a Rothschild-Stiglitz world

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
MARC record
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100  ‎$0‎MAPA20080648343‎$a‎Martin Boyer, M.
24510‎$a‎Insurance fraud in a Rothschild-Stiglitz world‎$c‎M. Martin Boyer, Richard Peter
520  ‎$a‎In this article, we model a competitive insurance market where policyholders privately have information about their probability of accident ex ante and know the state of the world ex post.We combine costly state verification without commitment and arguments from insurance contracting under adverse selection to characterize the resulting allocations. Insurance fraud convexifies the insurer's zero expected profit condition, which can lead to complete unraveling with low risks dropping out of the market. The standard case, however, involves rationing of low risks, which raises their probability of fraud and their success rate when committing it. As a result, adverse selection increases fraud in the economy. We also show that cross-subsidization from low risks to high risks mitigates the fraud externality. Our results highlight that adverse selection and insurance fraud interact in nontrivial ways and have the potential to aggravate each other
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080591052‎$a‎Fraude en el seguro
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080586294‎$a‎Mercado de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20190001342‎$a‎Administración de la empresa de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080592042‎$a‎Modelos matemáticos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080579258‎$a‎Cálculo actuarial
650  ‎$0‎MAPA20080541064‎$a‎Fraude
700  ‎$0‎MAPA20160007701‎$a‎Peter, Richard
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎02/03/2020 Volumen 87 Número 1 - marzo 2020 , p. 117-142