Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives : theory and evidence

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      <subfield code="a">Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives</subfield>
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      <subfield code="c">Raimond Maurer...[et al.]</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Many Americans claim Social Security benefits early, though this e aves them with lower monthly payments throughout retirement. We build a lifecycle model that closely tracks claiming patterns under rules, and we use it to predict claiming delays if, by delaying benefits, people were to receive a lump sum instead of an annuity. We predict that current early claimers would defer claiming by a year given actuarially fair lump sums, and the predictions conform with respondents' answers to a strategic survey about the lump sum. In other words, such a reform could provide an avenue for encouraging delayed retirement without benefit cuts or tax increases. Moreover, many people would still defer claiming even for smaller lump sums.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">01/03/2021 Volumen 88 Número 1 - marzo 2021 , p. 5-27</subfield>
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