Medicaid and long-term care : the effects of penalizing strategic asset transfers

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<dc:creator>Liu, Junhao </dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Mukherjee, A.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2021-03-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Medicaid provides a critical source of insurance for long term care, and individuals may strategically offload assets (typically to children) to meet the means-tested eligibility requirement. In this article, we quantify the extent of such behavior using variation in the penalty for improper parent-to-child transfers induced by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. We estimate difference-indifferences models based on the hypothesis that only individuals with high levels of nursing home risk (high risk) will alter transfers because of the Act. We find that a 2-year horizon, high-risk individuals reduced transfers to children on the extensive margin by 11 percent and that the average total amount of transfers decreased by $4,860. The results hold only for coupled respondents. We also conduct a tripledifferences analysis to examine heterogeneity with financial literacy and find that even those with a low level of financial literacy responded to the penalty.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/174699.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de dependencia</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de personas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Niños</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Medicaid</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Estados Unidos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Medicaid and long-term care : the effects of penalizing strategic asset transfers</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/03/2021 Volumen 88 Número 1 - marzo 2021 , p. 53-77</dc:relation>
<dc:coverage xml:lang="es">Estados Unidos</dc:coverage>
</rdf:Description>
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