Optimal annuitization with imperfect information about insolvency risk

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<dc:creator>Li, Hui </dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Neumuller, Seth </dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Rothschild, Casey</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2021-03-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Even the highest-rated life-annuity providers have a nonzero probability of becoming insolvent during an annuitant's retirement, and many potential annuitants are unaware of the state guaranty associations (SGAs) which provide insurance against the associated financial consequences. We study the theoretical implications of insolvency riskreal and perceivedfor annuitization. Then, using a disciplined calibration of annuitant misperceptions in a standard life cycle model, we show that even the modest perceived risk of default associated with highly-rated providers canabsent awareness of the SGAsreduce annuitization and significantly reduce. We further consider the implications of information frictions which prevent retirees from discerning true insolvency risk and we find that these frictions have plausibly large additional quantitative implications for annuitization and welfare. Simulations of our model further suggest that the general lack of awareness of the SGA backstop by potential annuitants can erode a sizable fraction of the potential welfare benefits thereof.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/174702.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Insolvencia</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Renta vitalicia</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Jubilación</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Pensiones</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos probabílisticos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Optimal annuitization with imperfect information about insolvency risk</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/03/2021 Volumen 88 Número 1 - marzo 2021 , p. 101-130</dc:relation>
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