Feasibility of Long-Term Interest Balance among Stakeholders in the Natural Catastrophe Insurance Market

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      <subfield code="a">Feasibility of Long-Term Interest Balance among Stakeholders in the Natural Catastrophe Insurance Market</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Ning Zhang, Yang-Che Wu, Wan-Shiou Yang</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">This study establishes a stakeholder framework in the natural catastrophe insurance market: Insurers charge policyholders the full insurance premium and pay the public catastrophe insurance scheme (PCIS) contributions for the contingent bailout. The government subsidizes policyholders and taxes insurers. Then a series of accounting procedures is developed to illustrate how the stakeholders' cash flows change. A numerical analysis reveals that both the PCIS and the subsidy policy can achieve long-term self-financing under special tax rates, contribution rates, and subsidy conditions. The results show that the short-term inequity of favoring insurers and policyholders can promote balanced long-term interests for all stakeholders.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080600204</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Catástrofes naturales</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">North American actuarial journal</subfield>
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      <subfield code="x">1092-0277</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">01/06/2021 Tomo 25 Número 2 - 2021 , p. 163-185</subfield>
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