Building resilience in cybersecurity : An artificial lab approach

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      <subfield code="a">Building resilience in cybersecurity</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">: An artificial lab approach</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Kerstin Awiszus [et al.]</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Based on classical contagion models we introduce an artificial cyber lab: the digital twin of a complex cyber system in which possible cyber resilience measures may be implemented and tested. Using the lab, in numerical case studies, we identify two classes of measures to control systemic cyber risks: security- and topology-based interventions. We discuss the implications of our findings on selected real-world cybersecurity measures currently applied in the insurance and regulation practice or under discussion for future cyber risk control. To this end, we provide a brief overview of the current cybersecurity regulation and emphasize the role of insurance companies as private regulators. Moreover, from an insurance point of view, we provide first attempts to design systemic cyber risk obligations and to measure the systemic risk contribution of individual policyholders</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">02/09/2024 Volumen 91 Número 3 - septiembre 2024 , p. 753 - 800</subfield>
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