Capital structure and transparency
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| Tag | 1 | 2 | Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| LDR | 00000nab a2200000 i 4500 | ||
| 001 | MAP20071502582 | ||
| 003 | MAP | ||
| 005 | 20080418123404.0 | ||
| 007 | hzruuu---uuuu | ||
| 008 | 020619e20020613fra|||| | |00010|fre d | ||
| 040 | $aMAP$bspa | ||
| 084 | $a937.411 | ||
| 100 | 1 | $0MAPA20080121273$aAlmazan, Andres | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | $aCapital structure and transparency$cAndres Almazan, Javier Suares, Sheridan Titman |
| 520 | 8 | $aFirms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about the firm. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency lowers firm value. The negative effect of transparency can explain the reluctance by firms of issuing equity when they are doing poorly. This negative effect of transparency is likely to be more important for technology firms, which choose lower debt ratios | |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080602444$aMatemática financiera |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080615703$aTransparencia financiera |
| 650 | 0 | 1 | $0MAPA20080567637$aValor capital |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080596484$aEstructura económica |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080587260$aRatios financieros |
| 650 | 1 | 1 | $0MAPA20080600624$aCostes de transacción |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20080116996$aSuárez, Javier | |
| 700 | 1 | $0MAPA20080180935$aTitman, Sheridan | |
| 711 | 2 | $0MAPA20080490348$aFirst Lecture organised by Finance-sur-Seine$cParis$d2002 | |
| 773 | 0 | $tFirst Lecture organised by Finance-sur-Seine$dParis : ESCP-EAP European School of Management$g13 junio 2002 ; [29] p. |