Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets

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<dc:creator>Villeneuve, Bertrand</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2003-09-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/56149.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Análisis del ciclo de vida</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Mandatory pensions and the intensity of adverse selection in life insurance markets </dc:title>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Título: The Journal of risk and insurance</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 70, number 3, September 2003 ;  p. 527-548</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
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