Contracting incentives and compensation for property-liability insurer executives

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      <subfield code="a">This article examines several hypotheses about the  structure and level of compensation for 103 property-liability chief executive officers (CEOs) from 1995 through 1997. The greater the level of the firm risk and the larger the firm, the greater the use of incentive compensation</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
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      <subfield code="g">Volume 71, number 1, March 2004 ;  p. 285-307</subfield>
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