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Insurance in a market for credence goods

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MARC record
Tag12Value
LDR  00000nab a2200000 i 4500
001  MAP20071506650
003  MAP
005  20080418125205.0
007  hzruuu---uuuu
008  050426e20050301usa|||| | |00010|eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa
084  ‎$a‎6
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080034184‎$a‎Sülzle, Kai
24510‎$a‎Insurance in a market for credence goods‎$c‎Kai Sülzle, Achim Wambach
5208 ‎$a‎This article study the impact of variations in the degree of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physician act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by pretending to perform inappropriately high treatment levels leading to over-charging patients
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080591052‎$a‎Fraude en el seguro
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080592028‎$a‎Modelos de análisis
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080592042‎$a‎Modelos matemáticos
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080119171‎$a‎Wambach, Achim
7404 ‎$a‎The Journal of risk and insurance
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Orlando‎$g‎Volume 72, number 1, March 2005 ; p. 159-176