Insurance in a market for credence goods

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<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Sülzle, Kai</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Wambach, Achim</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2005-03-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">This article study the impact of variations in the degree of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physician act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by pretending to perform inappropriately high treatment levels leading to over-charging patients</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/58547.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Fraude en el seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos de análisis</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos matemáticos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Insurance in a market for credence goods</dc:title>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Título: The Journal of risk and insurance</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 72, number 1, March 2005 ;  p. 159-176</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>