Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation

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<dc:creator>Saito, Kuniyoshi</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2006-06-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">This article examines whether adverse selection or moral hazard could be induced by rate regulation, which prohibits insurance companies from considering some attributes of drivers in setting premiums. Using an individual data set from a heavily regulated automobile insurance market, author arrives to a couple of conclusions</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/60019.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Empresas de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de automóviles</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Daño moral</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Selección de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Casos prácticos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Japón</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Testing for asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market under rate regulation</dc:title>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Título: The Journal of risk and insurance</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 73, number 1, June 2006 ;  p. 335-356</dc:relation>
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