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Banking regulation in an equilibrium model

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
LDR  00000cam a2200000 i 4500
001  MAP20070017164
003  MAP
005  20090507160234.0
007  hzruuu---uuuu
008  940207s1993 esp 00010 eng d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎921.91
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080208134‎$a‎Suárez, F. Javier
24510‎$a‎Banking regulation in an equilibrium model‎$c‎F. Javier Suárez
260  ‎$a‎Madrid‎$b‎Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros‎$c‎1993
300  ‎$a‎51 p.‎$c‎21 cm
4901 ‎$a‎Documento de trabajo‎$v‎9308
520  ‎$a‎In this paper, I analyze banking prudential regulation in an equilibrium model. Deposits are governmentally insured. Under plausible circumstances, subsidization of risk-taking by a flat rate premium leads to overinvestment in risky projects. Prudential regulation does not only cause direct effects on the solvency of risky banks, but also modifies the equilibrium allocation of wealth and intermediation margins. The equilibrium outcome affects the solvency of individual banks through the aggregate market variables, reinforcing or weakening the direct effect of any regulation reform
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080590116‎$a‎Depósitos bancarios
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080601775‎$a‎Garantía de depósitos
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080538217‎$a‎Banca
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080552701‎$a‎Solvencia
7102 ‎$0‎MAPA20080462697‎$a‎Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros
830 0‎$0‎MAPA20080514709‎$a‎Documento de trabajo‎$v‎9308