Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Banking regulation in an equilibrium model

MAP20070017164

Banking regulation in an equilibrium model / F. Javier Suárez. — Madrid : Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, 1993

51 p. ; 21 cm . — (Documento de trabajo ; 9308)

Sumario: In this paper, I analyze banking prudential regulation in an equilibrium model. Deposits are governmentally insured. Under plausible circumstances, subsidization of risk-taking by a flat rate premium leads to overinvestment in risky projects. Prudential regulation does not only cause direct effects on the solvency of risky banks, but also modifies the equilibrium allocation of wealth and intermediation margins. The equilibrium outcome affects the solvency of individual banks through the aggregate market variables, reinforcing or weakening the direct effect of any regulation reform

1. Depósitos bancarios . 2. Garantía de depósitos . 3. Banca . 4. Solvencia . I. Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros . II. Documento de trabajo ; 9308 . III. Título.