Can environmental insurance succeed where other strategies fail? the case of underground storage tanks

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><modsCollection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-8.xsd">
<mods version="3.8">
<titleInfo>
<title>Can environmental insurance succeed where other strategies fail? the case of underground storage tanks</title>
</titleInfo>
<name type="personal" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20110002404">
<namePart>Pfaff, Alex</namePart>
<nameIdentifier>MAPA20110002404</nameIdentifier>
</name>
<typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
<genre authority="marcgt">periodical</genre>
<originInfo>
<place>
<placeTerm type="code" authority="marccountry">esp</placeTerm>
</place>
<dateIssued encoding="marc">2011</dateIssued>
<issuance>serial</issuance>
</originInfo>
<language>
<languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">spa</languageTerm>
</language>
<physicalDescription>
<form authority="marcform">print</form>
</physicalDescription>
<abstract displayLabel="Summary">Private risk reduction will be socially efficient only when firms are liable for all the damage that they cause. We find that environmental insurance can  achieve social efficiency even when two traditional policy instruments-ex post fines an dris management mandates with ex ante fines-do not. Inefficiency occurs with ex post fines, when small firms declare bankruptcy and escape their liabilities, limiting the incentives from this policy tool. Firms ignore mandates to implement efficient risk management because regulatroy agencies do not have sufficient resources to monitor every firm.</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Haitao Yin, Alex Pfaff and Howard Kunreuther</note>
<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080591182">
<topic>Gerencia de riesgos</topic>
</subject>
<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080588953">
<topic>Análisis de riesgos</topic>
</subject>
<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080615284">
<topic>Riesgos medioambientales</topic>
</subject>
<subject authority="lcshac" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080636692">
<topic>Seguro de responsabilidad civil por daños al medio ambiente</topic>
</subject>
<classification authority="">7</classification>
<relatedItem type="host">
<titleInfo>
<title>Risk analysis : an international journal</title>
</titleInfo>
<originInfo>
<publisher>McLean, Virginia : Society for Risk Analysis, 1987-2015</publisher>
</originInfo>
<identifier type="issn">0272-4332</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077000345</identifier>
<part>
<text>Tomo 31 Número 1  - 2011</text>
</part>
</relatedItem>
<recordInfo>
<recordContentSource authority="marcorg">MAP</recordContentSource>
<recordCreationDate encoding="marc">110202</recordCreationDate>
<recordChangeDate encoding="iso8601">20110215102502.0</recordChangeDate>
<recordIdentifier source="MAP">MAP20110006440</recordIdentifier>
<languageOfCataloging>
<languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">spa</languageTerm>
</languageOfCataloging>
</recordInfo>
</mods>
</modsCollection>