The Efficiency of categorical discrimination in insurance markets

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<dc:creator>Rothschild, Casey</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2011-06-01</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Crocker and Snow (1986) show that banning categorization based on risk related characteristics such as gender or race in pricing insurance policies is inefficient whenever categorization is costless. Their analysis, by contrast,suggests ambiguous welfare effects of banning costly categorization. Author shows that this latter conclusion is incorrect: categorical pricing bans are inefficient even when categorization is costly. Whenever the ban-imposing government can instead provide breakeven partial social insurance, it can remove its ban in such a way that the insurance market will choose to employ the categorizing technology only when doing so is Pareto improving </dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/133228.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Estudios de investigación</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Matemática del seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Cálculo actuarial</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos analíticos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">The Efficiency of categorical discrimination in insurance markets</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 01/06/2011 Tomo 78 Número 2  - 2011 </dc:relation>
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