Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
  <record>
    <leader>00000cab a2200000   4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20110051549</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20110905120741.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">110805e20110601usa|||p      |0|||b|eng d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">1</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080189150</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Crocker, Keith J.</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Multidimensional screening in insurance markets with adverse selection</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Keith J. Crocker, Arthur Snow</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks, and thereby reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. Moreover, multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, resolving completely the RothschildStiglitz nonexistence puzzle in markets where the perils space is sufficiently divisible. </subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080616984</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Estudios de investigación</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080553630</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Coberturas</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080584290</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Contrato de seguro</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080609788</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Comunicación del riesgo</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080619992</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Obligaciones del asegurado</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080599096</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Selección de riesgos</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080582661</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Selección adversa</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20090003781</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Snow, Arthur</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="w">MAP20077000727</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">01/06/2011 Tomo 78 Número 2  - 2011 </subfield>
    </datafield>
  </record>
</collection>