The Impact of introducing insurance guaranty schemes on pricing and capital structure

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<title>Impact of introducing insurance guaranty schemes on pricing and capital structure</title>
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<namePart>Schmeiser, Hato</namePart>
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<namePart>Wagner, Joël</namePart>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">The introduction of an insurance guaranty scheme can have significant influence on the pricing and capital structures in a competitive market. The aim of this article is to study this effect on competitive equity-premium combinations while considering a framework with policyholders and equity holders where guaranty fund charges are volume-based, as levied in existing schemes. Several settings with regard to the origin of the fund contributions are assessed and the immediate effects on the incentives of the policyholders and equity holders are analyzed through a one-period contingent claim approach. One result is that introducing a guaranty scheme in a market with competitive conditions entails a shift of equity capital towards minimum solvency requirements. Hence, adverse incentives may arise with regard to the overall security level of the industry.</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Hato Schmeiser, Joël Wagner</note>
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<topic>Garantías</topic>
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<topic>Mercado de seguros</topic>
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<topic>Prestaciones complementarias</topic>
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<topic>Solvencia</topic>
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<topic>Productos de seguros</topic>
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<topic>Tarificación</topic>
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<topic>Requerimientos financieros</topic>
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<title>The Journal of risk and insurance</title>
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<publisher>Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">0022-4367</identifier>
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<text>03/06/2013 Volumen 80 Número 2 - junio 2013 , p. 273-308</text>
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