Rationale of underwriters' pricing conduct on competitive insurance market

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<dc:creator>Malinovskii, Vsevolod K.</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2013-09-02</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Underwriters'desire to show a good annual review is known to be a rationale of the aggressive pricing conduct. On the competitive insurance market, it impacts the global insurance processes and can lead to the competition-originated underwriting cycles. Applying Lundberg's model of the annual probability mechanism of insurance, we model the influence of a price reduction on migration and consequently on the company's annual expansion, revenue and solvency.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/144460.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Empresas de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Mercado de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos analíticos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Matemática del seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Tarificación</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Competitividad</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Rationale of underwriters' pricing conduct on competitive insurance market</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: Insurance : mathematics and economics. - Oxford : Elsevier, 1990- = ISSN 0167-6687. - 02/09/2013 Volumen 53 Número 2 - septiembre 2013 , p. 325-334</dc:relation>
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