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On the use of information in oligopolistic insurance markets

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1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20140008049‎$a‎Kesternich, Iris
24510‎$a‎On the use of information in oligopolistic insurance markets‎$c‎Iris Kesternich, Heiner Schumacher
520  ‎$a‎We analyze the use of information in an oligopolistic insurance market with costly market entry. For intermediate values of entry costs, an equilibrium exists that is profit maximizing for incumbents and in which companies do not discriminate between high and low risks. The model therefore provides an explanation for the existence of unused observables, that is, information that (1) insurance companies collect or could collect, (2) is correlated with risk, but (3) is not used to set premiums.
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077000727‎$t‎The Journal of risk and insurance‎$d‎Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-‎$x‎0022-4367‎$g‎03/03/2014 Volumen 81 Número 1 - marzo 2014
856  ‎$y‎MÁS INFORMACIÓN‎$u‎mailto:centrodocumentacion@fundacionmapfre.org?subject=Consulta%20de%20una%20publicaci%C3%B3n%20&body=Necesito%20m%C3%A1s%20informaci%C3%B3n%20sobre%20este%20documento%3A%20%0A%0A%5Banote%20aqu%C3%AD%20el%20titulo%20completo%20del%20documento%20del%20que%20desea%20informaci%C3%B3n%20y%20nos%20pondremos%20en%20contacto%20con%20usted%5D%20%0A%0AGracias%20%0A