Potential games with aggregation in non-cooperative general insurance markets

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
  <record>
    <leader>00000cab a2200000   4500</leader>
    <controlfield tag="001">MAP20170006732</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="003">MAP</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="005">20170301142252.0</controlfield>
    <controlfield tag="008">170301e20170102usa|||p      |0|||b|eng d</controlfield>
    <datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">MAP</subfield>
      <subfield code="b">spa</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">MAP</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">6</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20170002680</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Wu, Renchao</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <subfield code="a">Potential games with aggregation in non-cooperative general insurance markets</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Renchao Wu, Athanasios A. Pantelous</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="a">In the global insurance market, the number of product-specific policies from different companies has increased significantly, and strong market competition has boosted the demand for a competitive premium. Thus, in the present paper, by considering the competition between each pair of insurers, an N-player game is formulated to investigate the optimal pricing strategy by calculating the Nash equilibrium in an insurance market. Under that framework, each insurer is assumed to maximise its utility of wealth over the unit time interval. With the purpose of solving a game of N-players, the best-response potential game with non-linear aggregation is implemented. The existence of a Nash equilibrium is proved by finding a potential function of all insurers¿ payoff functions. A 12-player insurance game illustrates the theoretical findings under the framework in which the best-response selection premium strategies always provide the global maximum value of the corresponding payoff function.</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080602437</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Matemática del seguro</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080586294</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Mercado de seguros</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080590567</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Empresas de seguros</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080557591</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Competencia</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080591656</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Juego de simulación</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="0">MAPA20150002808</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Pantelous, Athanasios A.</subfield>
    </datafield>
    <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
      <subfield code="w">MAP20077000420</subfield>
      <subfield code="t">Astin bulletin</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Belgium : ASTIN and AFIR Sections of the International Actuarial Association</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0515-0361</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">02/01/2017 Volumen 47 Número 1 - enero 2017 , p. 269-302</subfield>
    </datafield>
  </record>
</collection>