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Advantageous selection, moral hazard, and insurer sorting on risk in the U.S. automobile insurance market

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      <subfield code="a">Robinson, Patricia A.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Advantageous selection, moral hazard, and insurer sorting on risk in the U.S. automobile insurance market</subfield>
      <subfield code="c">Patricia A. Robinson, Frank A. Sloan, Lindsey M. Eldred</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">This study quantifies the role of private information in automobile insurance policy choice using data on subjective beliefs, risk preference, reckless driving, the respondent's insurer, and insurance policy characteristics merged with insurer-specific quality ratings distributed by independent organizations. We find a zero correlation between ex post accident risk and insurance coverage, refiecting advantageous selection in policy choice offset by moral hazard. Advantageous selection is partly attributable to insurer sorting on consumer attributes known and used by insurers. Our analysis of insurer sorting reveals that lower-risk drivers on attributes observed by insurers obtain coverage from insurers with higher-quality ratings.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Mercado de seguros</subfield>
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      <subfield code="0">MAPA20080603779</subfield>
      <subfield code="a">Seguro de automóviles</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Coberturas</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Riesgo moral</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Sloan, Frank A.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Eldred, Lindsey M.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="t">The Journal of risk and insurance</subfield>
      <subfield code="d">Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964-</subfield>
      <subfield code="x">0022-4367</subfield>
      <subfield code="g">01/06/2018 Volumen 85 Número 2 - junio 2018 , p. 545-575</subfield>
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