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Quality uncertainty and informative advertising

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Registro MARC
Tag12Valor
LDR  00000cam a2200000 i 4500
001  MAP20070028505
003  MAP
005  20220912132029.0
008  971113s1997 esp 00010 spa d
040  ‎$a‎MAP‎$b‎spa‎$d‎MAP
084  ‎$a‎938
1001 ‎$0‎MAPA20080362829‎$a‎Moraga González, José Luis
24510‎$a‎Quality uncertainty and informative advertising‎$c‎José Luis Moraga González
260  ‎$a‎Getafe [Madrid]‎$b‎Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía‎$c‎1997
300  ‎$a‎37 p.‎$c‎30 cm
4901 ‎$a‎Working paper‎$v‎97-46. Economics Series 23
5200 ‎$a‎We consider a single period model where a monopolist introduces a product of uncertain quality. Before pricing and informative advertising decisions take place, the producer observes the true quality of the good while consumers receive an independent signal which is correlated with the true quality of the product. When adverting occurs in equilibrium, the adverse selection problem is mitigated. Moreover, the lower are advertising costs, the more intense is the alleviation of that problem.
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080543334‎$a‎Calidad
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080556020‎$a‎Publicidad
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080614577‎$a‎Lanzamiento de productos
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080565992‎$a‎Incertidumbre
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080586454‎$a‎Modelos analíticos
7102 ‎$0‎MAPA20080475611‎$a‎Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economía
830 0‎$0‎MAPA20080507589‎$a‎Working paper‎$v‎97-46. Economics Series 23