Centro de Documentacion de Fundación MAPFRE - Quality uncertainty and informative advertising

MAP20070028505

Quality uncertainty and informative advertising / José Luis Moraga González. — Getafe [Madrid] : Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía, 1997

37 p. ; 30 cm . — (Working paper ; 97-46. Economics Series 23)

Materia: We consider a single period model where a monopolist introduces a product of uncertain quality. Before pricing and informative advertising decisions take place, the producer observes the true quality of the good while consumers receive an independent signal which is correlated with the true quality of the product. When adverting occurs in equilibrium, the adverse selection problem is mitigated. Moreover, the lower are advertising costs, the more intense is the alleviation of that problem

1. Calidad . 2. Publicidad . 3. Lanzamiento de productos . 4. Incertidumbre . 5. Modelos analíticos . I. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economía . II. Working paper ; 97-46. Economics Series 23 . III. Título.

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