Quality uncertainty and informative advertising

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<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Moraga González, José Luis</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economía</dc:creator>
<dc:date>1997</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Materia: We consider a single period model where a monopolist introduces a product of uncertain quality. Before pricing and informative advertising decisions take place, the producer observes the true quality of the good while consumers receive an independent signal which is correlated with the true quality of the product. When adverting occurs in equilibrium, the adverse selection problem is mitigated. Moreover, the lower are advertising costs, the more intense is the alleviation of that problem.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/16616.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:publisher>Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía</dc:publisher>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Calidad</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Publicidad</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Lanzamiento de productos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Incertidumbre</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos analíticos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Libros</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Quality uncertainty and informative advertising</dc:title>
<dc:format xml:lang="es">37 p. ; 30 cm</dc:format>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">Working paper ; 97-46. Economics Series 23</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
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