Actuarial independence and managerial discretion

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<dc:creator>Kamiya, Shinichi</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Milidonis, Andreas</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2018-12-03</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: Appointed actuaries are responsible for estimating the largest liability on property-casualty insurance companies' balance sheet. Actuarial independence is crucial in safeguarding accurate estimates, where this independence is self-regulated by actuarial professional institutions. However, professional conflicts of interest arise when appointed actuaries also hold an officer position within the same firm, as officer actuaries also face managerial incentives. Using a sample of U.S. insurers that employ in-house appointed actuaries from 2007 to 2014, we find evidence that officer actuaries have different reserving practices than nonofficer actuaries. This difference in reserving is associated with tax shielding and earnings management incentives. Results are consistent with managerial discretion dominating actuarial independence; they are economically significant and should be of concern to regulators and professional institutions</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/166579.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Actuarios</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Directivos de empresas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Empresas de seguros</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Matemática del seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Responsabilidad civil</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Seguro de daños patrimoniales</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Estados Unidos</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Actuarial independence and managerial discretion</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 1055-1082</dc:relation>
<dc:coverage xml:lang="es">Estados Unidos</dc:coverage>
</rdf:Description>
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