Moral hazard and long-term care insurance
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001 | MAP20190012447 | ||
003 | MAP | ||
005 | 20220911202943.0 | ||
008 | 190507e20190401esp|||p |0|||b|spa d | ||
040 | $aMAP$bspa$dMAP | ||
084 | $a34 | ||
245 | 0 | 0 | $aMoral hazard and long-term care insurance$cR. Tamara Konetzka...[et.al] |
520 | $aIn private long-term care insurance markets, moral hazard is central to pricing and long-run robustness of the market, yet there is remarkably little evidence on the extent to which moral hazard is present in long-term care insurance. We use Health and Retirement Study data from 1996 to 2014 to assess moral hazard in nursing home and home care use in private long-term care insurance, employing a combination of propensity score matching and instrumental variables approaches. We find evidence of significant moral hazard in home care use and a potentially meaningful but noisy effect on nursing home use. Policymakers designing incentives to promote private long-term care insurance should consider the consequences of moral hazard. | ||
650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080603786$aSeguro de dependencia | |
650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080598358$aProductos de seguros | |
650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080601522$aEvaluación de riesgos | |
650 | 4 | $0MAPA20080564049$aRiesgo moral | |
700 | 1 | $0MAPA20190005470$aKonetzka, R. Tamara | |
773 | 0 | $wMAP20077100215$tGeneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice$dGeneva : The Geneva Association, 1976-$x1018-5895$g01/04/2019 Volumen 44 Número 2 - abril 2019 , p. 231-251 |