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Moral hazard and long-term care insurance

Recurso electrónico / Electronic resource
Registro MARC
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24500‎$a‎Moral hazard and long-term care insurance‎$c‎R. Tamara Konetzka...[et.al]
520  ‎$a‎In private long-term care insurance markets, moral hazard is central to pricing and long-run robustness of the market, yet there is remarkably little evidence on the extent to which moral hazard is present in long-term care insurance. We use Health and Retirement Study data from 1996 to 2014 to assess moral hazard in nursing home and home care use in private long-term care insurance, employing a combination of propensity score matching and instrumental variables approaches. We find evidence of significant moral hazard in home care use and a potentially meaningful but noisy effect on nursing home use. Policymakers designing incentives to promote private long-term care insurance should consider the consequences of moral hazard.
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080603786‎$a‎Seguro de dependencia
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080598358‎$a‎Productos de seguros
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080601522‎$a‎Evaluación de riesgos
650 4‎$0‎MAPA20080564049‎$a‎Riesgo moral
7001 ‎$0‎MAPA20190005470‎$a‎Konetzka, R. Tamara
7730 ‎$w‎MAP20077100215‎$t‎Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice‎$d‎Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976-‎$x‎1018-5895‎$g‎01/04/2019 Volumen 44 Número 2 - abril 2019 , p. 231-251