Equilibrium in insurance markets with adverse selection when insurers pay policy dividends

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<rdf:Description>
<dc:creator>Picard, Pierre</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2019-12-02</dc:date>
<dc:description xml:lang="es">Sumario: We show that an equilibrium always exists in the RothschildStiglitz insurance market model with adverse selection and an arbitrary number of risk types, when insurance contracts include policy dividend rules. The MiyazakiWilsonSpence state-contingent allocation is an equilibrium allocation (defined as a set of type-dependent lotteries sustained at a symmetric equilibrium of a market game), and it is the only one when out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy a robustness criterion. It is shown that stock insurers and mutuals may coexist, with stock insurers offering insurance coverage at actuarial price and mutuals cross-subsidizing risks.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>https://documentacion.fundacionmapfre.org/documentacion/publico/es/bib/170166.do</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>spa</dc:language>
<dc:rights xml:lang="es">InC - http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Gerencia de riesgos</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Contrato de seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Modelos actuariales</dc:subject>
<dc:subject xml:lang="es">Matemática del seguro</dc:subject>
<dc:type xml:lang="es">Artículos y capítulos</dc:type>
<dc:title xml:lang="es">Equilibrium in insurance markets with adverse selection when insurers pay policy dividends</dc:title>
<dc:relation xml:lang="es">En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 02/12/2019 Volumen 86 Número 4 - diciembre 2019 , p. 887-914</dc:relation>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>