Will genetic test results be monetized in life insurance?
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<title>Will genetic test results be monetized in life insurance?</title>
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<namePart>Haçarýz, Oytun </namePart>
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<abstract displayLabel="Summary">If life insurers are not permitted to use genetic test results in underwriting, they may face adverse selection. It is sometimes claimed that applicants will choose abnormally high sums insured as a form of financial gamble, possibly financed by life settlement companies (LSCs). The latter possibility is given some credence by the recent experience of stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) in the United States. We examine these claims, and find them unconvincing for four reasons. First, apparently high mortality implies surprisingly high probabilities of surviving for decades, so the gamble faces long odds. Second, LSCs would have to adopt a different business model, involving much longer time horizons. Third, STOLI is being effectively dealt with by the U.S. courts. Fourth, the gamble would be predicated upon a deep understanding of the genetic epidemiology, which is evolving, subject to uncertain biases, and cannot predict the emergence of effective treatments.</abstract>
<note type="statement of responsibility">Oytun Haçarýz...[et al.]</note>
<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20090004726">
<topic>Tests genéticos</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080570590">
<topic>Seguro de vida</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080582661">
<topic>Selección adversa</topic>
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<subject xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="MAPA20080586294">
<topic>Mercado de seguros</topic>
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<title>Risk management & insurance review</title>
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<publisher>Malden, MA : The American Risk and Insurance Association by Blackwell Publishing, 1999-</publisher>
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<identifier type="issn">1098-1616</identifier>
<identifier type="local">MAP20077001748</identifier>
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<text>01/12/2020 Tomo 23 Número 4 - 2020 , p. 379-399</text>
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