Capital structure and transparency

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      <subfield code="a">Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about the firm. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency lowers firm value. The negative effect of transparency can explain the reluctance by firms of issuing equity when they are doing poorly. This negative effect of transparency is likely to be more important for technology firms, which choose lower debt ratios</subfield>
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