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Asymmetric information problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market : the effect of policy design on loss charasteristics

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008  040531e20040321usa|||| | |00010|eng d
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1102 ‎$0‎MAPA20080442118‎$a‎Wang, Jennifer L.
24510‎$a‎Asymmetric information problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market‎$b‎: the effect of policy design on loss charasteristics‎$c‎Jennifer L. Wang
5208 ‎$a‎This artice investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan . Using panel data for the comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1955 to 1999, this article analyzes how types of coverage , deductible amounts , and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demostrate that the loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self- selection mechanisms in policies with diffrent levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown possibly to have decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080603779‎$a‎Seguro de automóviles
65001‎$0‎MAPA20080590567‎$a‎Empresas de seguros
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080553630‎$a‎Coberturas
65011‎$0‎MAPA20080542429‎$a‎Taiwan
7400 ‎$a‎Risk management and insurance review
7730 ‎$t‎Risk management and insurance review‎$d‎New York : The American Risk and Insurance Association‎$g‎Vol. 7, nº 1 Spring 2004 ; p. 53-71