Optimalidad en la provisión de servicios públicos : unos resultados preliminares
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<subfield code="a">This paper analyzes the conditions under which majority voting results in the optimal provision of a given public good. Among other findings, the paper demonstrates that when individual preferences are additive and income distribution is skewed to the right (which empirically is the case), provision of the public good is optimal when taxes are proportional; whereas when the taxes are regressive (progressive) the quantity provided is "too small" ("too large").</subfield>
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