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Testing for asymmetric information in reinsurance markets

Recurso electrónico / electronic resource
Sección: Artículos
Título: Testing for asymmetric information in reinsurance markets / Zhiqiang Yan, Liang HongAutor: Yan, Zhiqiang
Notas: Sumario: Empirical studies on asymmetric information have mainly focused on primary insurance markets, but comparatively little attention has been given to reinsurance markets. This study investigates the existence of asymmetric information by testing for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk in three major reinsurance markets for the period 1995-2000 and finds that (1) asymmetric information problems are present in the private passenger auto liability and homeowners reinsurance markets, but not in the product liability reinsurance market; (2) retention limits are widely utilised to mitigate asymmetric information problems; (3) long-term contracting relationships are either rarely used or not effective in controlling asymmetric information problems.Registros relacionados: En: Geneva papers on risk and insurance : issues and practice. - Geneva : The Geneva Association, 1976- = ISSN 1018-5895. - 05/01/2015 Volumen 40 Número 1 - enero 2015 , p. 29-46Materia / lugar / evento: Mercado de reaseguros Reaseguro Análisis empírico Información asimétrica Riesgo moral Selección adversa Obligaciones contractuales Otros autores: Hong, Liang
Otras clasificaciones: 5
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